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FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE: SECOND CIRCUIT
REJECTS "100 MILE RULE" IN FAVOR OF
DISCRETIONARY TAXATION OF WITNESSES'
TRAVEL EXPENSES
SINCE taxable costs in American litigation include only a portion
of the expenses of an action, generally the prevailing party is not
made whole.1 One restriction on taxable costs in the federal courts
is the "100 mile rule,' 2 which limits the mileage allowable for a
witness from outside the district to a distance of one hundred miles
from the place of trial.3 In Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. ,4 the
1 See generally, 3 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROcEDuRE §§ 1195-
201 (Wright ed. 1958); CHADBOURN & LEVIN, CASES ON CIVIL PROcEDURE 427-63 (1961);
McCoRmICK, DAMAcES §§ 60-71 (1935); 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAGTICE 54.70.77 (2d
ed. 1953); Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929); Peck, Taxation of Costs in U.S.
District Courts, 42 NEB. L. REv. 788 (1963); Comment, 44 ILL. L. REV. 507 (1949);
Comment, 49 YALE L.J. 699 (1940); Note, 53 COLUm. L. REv. 78 (1953).
2 Prior to Farmer, the "100 mile rule" had been accepted in the courts of appeal
in six circuits. Ludvigsen v. Commercial Stevedoring Co., 228 F.2d 707 (2d Cir.)
(dictum), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1014 (1956); Vincennes Steel Corp. v. Miller, 94 F.2d
347 (5th Cir. 1938); Kenyon v. Automatic Instrument Co., 10 F.R.D. 248 (W.D. Mich.
1950), aff'd, 186 F.2d 752 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 820 (1951); Friedman v.
Washburn Co., 155 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1946); Spiritwood Grain Co. v. Northern Pac.
Ry., 179 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1950) (dictum); Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research
Labs., Inc., 232 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1956).
In addition, district courts within all other circuits had accepted the rule. Com-
merce Oil Ref. Corp. v. Miner, 198 F. Supp. 895 (D.R.I. 1961) (1st Cir.); Perlman v.
Feldmann, 116 F. Supp. 102 (D. Conn. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 219 F.2d 173
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955); Consolidated Fisheries Co. v. Fairbanks,
Morse & Co., 106 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Pa. 1952) (3d Cir.); Barnhart v. Jones, 9 F.R.D.
423 (S.D.W. Va. 1949) (4th Cir.); United States v. Green, 196 Fed. 255 (D.N.M. 1912)
(10th Cir.).
Three cases have intimated that there might be exceptions to the rule in certain
circumstances. Pinson v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R., 54 Fed. 464 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1893)
(imperative necessity of presence of witness); Smith v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 38 Fed.
321 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1889) (where one party amends pleadings or changes issues on
eve of trial); The Vernon, 36 Fed. 113 (E.D. Mich. 1888) (necessity of presence of
witness when deposition is unsatisfactory). But see Gallagher v. Union Pac. R.R., 7
F.R.D. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
Two early Massachusetts cases, United States v. Sanborn, 28 Fed. 299 (C.C.D. Mass.
1886), revrd on other grounds, 135 U.S. 271 (1890) and Prouty v. Draper, 20 Fed. Cas.
13 (No. 11,447) (C.C.D. Mass. 1842), rejected the rule, but this position was criticized
in The Governor Ames, 187 Fed. 40 (1st Cir. 1910). See also Commerce Oil Ref.
Corp. v. Miner, supra.
Recent cases rejecting the rule are: Bennett Chemical Co. v. Atlantic Commodities,
Ltd., 24 F.R.D. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Maresco v. Flota Mercante Grancolumbiana, S.A.,
167 F. Supp. 845 (E.D.N.Y. 1958); Bank of America v. Loew's Int'l Corp., 163 F. Supp.
924 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Knox v. Anderson, 163 F. Supp. 822 (D. Hawaii 1958).
3 "[jn the case of a witness from without the district, mileage allowable should
be that which was traveled within the district, or actual mileage traveled in and out
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Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the 100 mile rule and
allowed the taxation of actual mileage of witnesses at the trial court's
discretion.
At the first trial in an action for damages for breach of an em-
ployment contract, the court directed a verdict for defendant 5 and
taxed plaintiff with mileage from Saudi Arabia to New York for
three of defendant's witnesses.0 On appeal, the judgment was re-
versed on the merits and remanded.7 At the second jury trial, after
a verdict for defendant, the court found the mileage allowed by the
first trial court to be excessive and limited allowable mileage to one
hundred miles.8 However, it did so as a matter of discretion and
expressly declined to consider the "100 mile rule." On appeal, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected altogether the 100 mile
rule, upheld the second trial court's exercise of discretion, but rein-
stated the costs assessed by the first trial court as being within that
court's discretion.9
The Court of Appeals rejected the 100 mile rule on two grounds.
First, the rule has no valid statutory basis. Neither the statute
authorizing the taxation of witnesses' expenses 0 nor the statute estab-
of the district up to 100 miles, whichever is the greater . . . . The mileage of a
witness from within the district would still be the actual mileage traveled." Kemart
Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Labs., Inc., 232 F.2d 897, 904 (9th Cir. 1956).
(Emphasis in original.)
'324 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1963).
5Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 176 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). The judge
granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict after the trial had terminated in a
jury disagreement.
" See Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 285 F.2d 720, 722 (2d Cir. 1960). Total costs
assessed were $6,601.08, including $3,995.50 for mileage from Saudi Arabia.
7Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 277 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 824
(1960). On remand, the action was dismissed for plaintiff's refusal to post bond to
secure costs. Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., Civil No. 111-103, S.D.N.Y., Nov. 22, 1960.
Again there was an appeal, and the dismissal was reversed on the ground that
plaintiff was denied his day in court by the imposition of excessive bond. Farmer
v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., supra note 6. Thereupon the second jury trial took place.
8 Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 31 F.R.D. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The Clerk of
Court at the second trial taxed costs at $11,900.12, including the total costs of the
first trial ($6,601.08) and $3,595.50 for transportation of witnesses from Saudi Arabia
to the second trial. The judge reduced this amount to $831.60 by reducing the mile-
age allowance for witnesses to one hundred miles to and from the courthouse for
each trial and by disallowing expenses for transcripts, stenographer's fees at pretrial
hearings and other items. 31 F.R.D. at 194-97; 324 F.2d at 361-62.
" 324 F.2d at 359. However, the court disallowed $2,064.00, the costs taxed at the
first trial for two witnesses who came from Saudi Arabia in otherwise unoccupied
seats on a regularly scheduled flight in a company plane.
1028 U.S.C. § 1920(3) (1958). See note 32 infra.
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lishing allowable mileage rates1 contains such a limitation. The
rule was derived purely by implication 2 from the one hundred mile
limitation on the subpoena power of federal courts outside their
respective districts.' 3 Moreover, the 1949 amendment to the mile-
age statute authorizes the allowance of actual mileage in lieu of the
usual statutory rates for witnesses traveling to and from the conti-
nental United States.' 4 Second, the court concluded that the rule
has no valid basis in reason. It has been justified as adhering to two
axioms of American jurisprudence: that expenses of a lawsuit should
1128 U.S.C. § 1821 (1958). "A witness attending in any court of the United States,
.or before a United States commissioner, or before any person authorized to take his
deposition pursuant to any rule or order of a court of the United States, shall receive
$4 for each day's attendance and for the time necessarily occupied in going to and
returning from the same, and 8 cents per mile for going from and returning to his
place of residence. . . . Witnesses . . .who attend at points so far removed from
their respective residence(s] as to prohibit return thereto from day to day shall be
entitled to an additional allowance of $8 per day for expenses of subsistence including
the time necessarily occupied in going to and returning from the place of attendance:
Provided, That in lieu of the mileage allowance provided for herein, witnesses who
are required to travel between the Territories and possessions, or to and from the
continental United States, shall be entitled to the actual expenses of travel at the
lowest first-class rate available at the time of reservation for passage, by means of
transportation employed ...."
12 For judicial analysis of the derivation of the rule see, e.g., Kemart Corp. v.
Printing Arts Research Labs., Inc., 232 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1956); Vincennes Steel Corp.
v. Miller, 94 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1938); Barnhart v. Jones, 9 F.R.D. 423 (S.D.W. Va. 1949).
The rule has been codified only in Admiralty Rule 47, promulgated by the Supreme
Court. This enforcement of the limitation by the Court was one reason for Judge
Smith's reluctance to discard it in Farmer. 324 F.2d at 367 (dissenting opinion). How-
ever, rule 47 has been abrogated by the Advisory Committee on Admiralty Rules in
its recent revision of the rules. See Amendments to Effect Unification of Civil and
Admiralty Procedure, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil
Procedure for the United States District Courts, Part I (March 1964).
1 Fm. R. Civ. P. 45 (e). This rule replaced the code provision for subpoena limits,
28 U.S.C. § 654 (1940) (formerly Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 6, 1 Stat. 335).
4Act of May 10, 1949, ch. 96, 63 Stat. 65. This amendment, among other changes,
added the proviso dealing with foreign witnesses. See note 11 supra. The majority in
Farmer interpreted this proviso as abrogating the 100 mile rule to the extent that
it applied to foreign witnesses; i.e., that all witnesses covered by the proviso were
entitled to full compensation for travel expenses from origin to destination and that
these expenses were to be taxed as costs without limitation. The dissent, on the
other hand, concluded that the proviso merely substituted actual per mile rates for
the statutory rates and that the actual rates were taxable as costs, but only to the
-extent of one hundred miles. Since the 100 mile rule was in effect at the time of
-the amendment and since there is no specific mention of the rule either in the
amendment or in its legislative history, the analysis of the dissent seems to be sound.
See S. R1P. No. 187, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. (1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S. CODE CoNG. SEaV.
1231-33. Moreover, there is authority to the effect that the 1949 amendment dealt only
-with allowances to witnesses and not with taxable costs. See, e.g., Ludvigsen v. Com-
mercial Stevedoring Co., 228 F.2d 707 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1014 (1956).
However, as this note points out, there are valid reasons for rejecting the rule
which are not dependent on statutory interpretation.
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be borne by the incurring party;15 and that all persons, particularly
impecunious persons, should be assured access to the courts.16 How-
ever, the normal practice of imposing attorney's fees on the incur-
ring party is sufficient compliance with the first axiom and therefore
the 100 mile rule merely adds an unnecessary burden to the pre-
vailing party.' 7 Furthermore, the second axiom would be more ef-
fectively served by a discretionary rule, whereby the court might
consider such factors as "the relative financial resources of the parties
and the ability of the unsuccessful litigant to bear the costs of the
litigation, where the action has been prosecuted in all good faith."' 8
The rule of discretion adopted in Farmer is consistent with well
established practice. In Engalnd, costs representing substantially all
of the expenses of an action are awarded, at the court's discretion,
to the prevailing party.19 Similarly, in American federal courts, be-
fore the appearance of the Federal Rules of civil procedure, costs
were allowed to the prevailing party at the court's discretion in
equity, but as a matter of course at law.20 Under the Federal Rules,
however, costs in all actions are allowed at the court's discretion,
unless prohibited by statute or the rules.2' Although the American
1 3 24 F.2d at 363, 367-68.
120 324 F.2d at 363, 365.
" "Fees for legal services are usually the largest single expense of litigation. In
most cases, the prevailing party must pay such fees himself, even if he has come into
court only to defend against an unjust accusation. There is no reason to extend this
practice further. Certainly there is no reason to extend it by the curious means of
limiting the recovery of travel expenses to 100 miles .... 324 F.2d at 363. (Emphasis
added.)
Since the 100 mile rule itself and federal statutes, supra notes 10 and 11, reduce
to some degree the burden of costs borne by the prevailing party, this axiom may be
of questionable validity. Certainly the court accepts it to a limited extent only.
18 324 F.2d at 363. This statement forms one basis for defendant's cross petition
to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, on the ground that it advocates a deep
pocket theory of justice. Cross Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, pp. 5, 10-11. While it is true that defendant
was denied certain costs in Farmer, substantial costs were imposed on the financially
weaker of the two parties, indicating that the court, at least, did not consider the
ability to pay to be controlling. However, the denial of costs is usually based on the
presence of bad faith, and if the court did consider the relative financial resources
of the parties, this would be a novel element of discretionary power in American
courts. For discussions of the use of substantial costs to control parties in cases of
bad faith, see, e.g., Goodhart, supra note 1, at 877-78; Comment, 44 ILL. L. REv. 507
(1949); Comment, 49 YALE L.J. 699 (1940); Note, 53 COLUM. L. Rav. 78 (1953); 74
HARv. L. REv. 1464 (1961).
' See Goodhart, supra note 1, at 854.
20 BARON & HOLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 1, § 1195, at 43.
21 FED. R. Ctv. P. 54 (d) provides: "Except when express provision therefor is made
either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of
course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs ...."
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rule is basically similar to the English rule, the practice in Ameri-
can courts is to deny the taxation of certain major items of expense, 22
particularly attorney's fees.23 Such allocation is still a matter of dis-
cretion, however, and courts have frequently asserted the power to
allow any costs where there are compelling equitable considera-
tions.24
The one hundred mile limitation on the court's discretionary
power to tax expenses of witnesses will not withstand close analysis.
In the first place, even as a means of allocating costs under the pre-
vailing American rule, the limitation is arbitrary and outdated. The
one hundred mile subpoena limit from which it was implied was
first codified in 1793.25 While the extension of the subpoena limit
to taxable travel expenses may have had some validity then, it seems
unrealistic today in light of modern transportation. If an arbitrary
limit is essential, a more meaningful figure, perhaps five hundred
miles, should be adopted. In addition, it is evident that the 100
mile rule is inconsistently applied. For example, subsistence allow-
ances for witnesses from outside subpoena limits are not arbitrarily
22 The specific costs allowable are prescribed by statutes, court rules, and local
practices. See, e.g., Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 316-17 (1920); Kemart Corp. v.
Printing Arts Research Labs., Inc., 232 F.2d 897, 899 (9th Cir. 1956); McWilliams
Dredging Co. v. Department of Highways, 187 F.2d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1951); Williams
v. Sawyer Bros., 51 F.2d 1004, 1005 (2d Cir. 1931).
28 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 1, 54.70, at 1301-02. Expert witness fees and pre-
trial expenses are also generally disallowed; however, attorney's fees represent the
largest single item of expense of a lawsuit. Id.
The disallowance of attorney's fees as costs in the United States stems from the
general antipathy toward lawyers in the colonies and from the idea that the expense
of a lawsuit is an accepted risk of society. See generally, POUND, Tan SPIRT OF TE
CorzxsoN LAw 112-38 (1921); Goodhart, supra note 1, at 873.
Statutes in some jurisdictions allow token amounts to be taxed as attorney's fees,
but these amounts usually represent a minimal portion of actual fees. See, e.g.,
Distler, The Course of Costs of Course, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 76 (1960); Goodhart, supra
note 1, at 873-74. However, there are several federal statutes which allow full recovery
of attorney's fees as an element of damages in certain actions. For a comprehensive
list of such statutes, see MooRE, op. cit. supra note 1, 54.71[2], at 1318-22. See also
note 24 infra and accompanying text.
2 See, e.g., Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Cleveland v. Second
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.2d 466, (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 775 (1945);
Swan Carburetor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 149 F.2d 476 (6th Cir. 1945); American Auto
Ass'n v. Spiegel, 128 F. Supp. 794 (E.D.N.Y. 1955); Coca-Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola Labs.,
Inc., 57 F. Supp. 911, 913 (D. Md. 1944), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 155 F.2d 59
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 773 (1946). But see United States v. Kolesar, 313 F.2d
835, 838 (5th Cir. 1963); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
51 F. Supp. 36, 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), rev'd, 145 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1944) rev'd, 325 U.S.
797 (1945).25 Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 6, 1 Stat. 335.
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limited.26 Moreover, subpoena limits are irrelevant in determining
whether a witness is to be paid. The relevant factors considered by
the courts are the materiality of the testimony27 and the necessity
for attendance,28 even in the case of voluntary witnesses from out-
side subpoena limits.2 9
Secondly, the 100 mile rule is not an effective device for pro-
tecting the interests of poor litigants. A party with a just claim may
be equally deterred by the prospect of paying the mileage of his own
witnesses in excess of one hundred miles as by the prospect of bear-
ing the full travel expenses of his adversary's witnesses.30 The rule
benefits the indigent loser, but hurts the indigent victor. The
Farmer rule, on the other hand, while permitting general obeisance
to the American rule of costs and preventing inequities through the
exercise of judicial discretion, would also allow full recovery in ap-
propriate cases.3'
Finally, absent the implication from subpoena limits, there
seems to be no valid reason for treating witnesses' mileage different-
ly from other specific statutory items.32 One reason often advanced
is that unlimited travel expenses would be unreasonably large and
2 See, e.g., Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Labs., Inc., 232 F.2d 897 (9th
Cir. 1956); Banana Distribs., Inc. v. United Fruit Co., 19 F.R.D. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1956);
Gallagher v. Union Pac. R.R., 7 F.R.D. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). See also note 11 supra.
-7 See, e.g., Spiritwood Grain Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 179 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1950).
201 See, e.g., Peck, supra note 1, at 795.
20 See, e.g., Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Labs., Inc., 232 F.2d 897 (9th
Cir. 1956); Gallagher v. Union Pac. R.R., 7 F.R.D. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
00 For example, if the plaintiff in Farmer had transported the witnesses from Saudi
Arabia and had lost the suit, he would have paid $7,591.00 in mileage expenses
($3,995.50 for the first trial and $3,595.50 for the second trial). See notes 6 and 8
supra. On the other hand, if he had won the suit, his expenses would still have been
$7,399.00 ($7,591.00 less $192.00 taxable under the 100 mile rule). Clearly the deterrent
effect in either case would be substantial.
"I The liberalization and increased use of actions in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 (1958) would provide additional protection for the impecunious litigant. See,
e.g., STMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 20-30 (3d ed. 1924); WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF
JUDICIAL ADMtINISTRATION 574-75 (1929); Goodhart, supra! note 1, at 875; Maguire,
Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. Rv. 361 (1923).
0328 U.S.C. § 1920 (1958) provides for taxation of: " (1) Fees of the clerk and mar-
shall; (2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript
necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) Fees and disbursements for printing and
witnesses; (4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for
use in the case; (5) Docket fees .... "
Similarly, there are compelling reasons not to treat ordinary witnesses' expenses
in the same manner as attorney's fees. First, there are no express statutory limitations
on witnesses' expenses, whereas attorney's fees are allowed by statute only in special
cases or in limited amounts. Second, witnesses' expenses do not have the same his-
torical background as attorney's fees. See notes 14 and 23 supra.
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that the taxation of such sums would impose an excessive burden
on the losing party.33 However, other taxable costs also involve
large sums3 4 which are often allowed under the discretionary power
of the courts.35 If the discretionary rule is effective in controlling
other sizeable items, it should be equally effective in controlling
witnesses' expenses. It is also urged that depositions afford an ef-
fective and less expensive substitute for the calling of witnesses. 80
Although this may be true in some cases, it must be remembered
that deposition expenses are also taxable as costs and have them-
selves been criticized as being burdensome in some instances.5 7
Moreover, as Farmer indicates, the physical presence of witnesses at
the trial is often critical.38 Therefore, it would seem that the avail-
ability of depositions should not preclude the allowance of actual
mileage for witnesses, but should merely weigh in the court's exer-
cise of discretion.
The instant decision, in rejecting the 100 mile rule as being
arbitrary and anachronistic, is sound. There are compelling reasons
for the adoption of a rule of discretion which will allow the court
to consider the equities of each situation and to treat witnesses' ex-
penses in the same manner as other statutory costs. In light of the
safeguards of appellate review 9 and the store of judicial experience
I' See, e.g., Lee v. Pennsylvania R.R., 93 F. Supp. 309, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Barn.
hart v. Jones, 9 F.R.D. 423, 425 (S.D.W. Va. 1949); Buffalo Ins. Co. v. Providence &
Stonington S.S. Co., 29 Fed. 237 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886). It is interesting to note that
both the trial judge who formulated the Farmer rule and one dissenting appellate
judge in Farmer expressed the same fear of extravagant lawsuits. Compare 31 F.R.D.
at 193, with 324 F.2d at 369.
31 It is not difficult to imagine cases where even extensive mileage allowances would
be less than other allowable costs. For example, in the instant case, if three of
defendant's witnesses had flown from California to New York for one trial, the actual
mileage under the statute would be $1,440.00 (three witnesses x 6,000 miles x eight
cents per mile), which is less than the allowance for the single item of stenographic
fees ($1,812.30).
"5See, e.g., Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 324 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1963) (steno-
graphic fees, $1,812.30); Swan Carburetor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 149 F.2d 476 (6th Cir.
1945) (charts and drawings, $3,179.80); Commerce Oil Ref. Corp. v. Miner, 198 F.
Supp. 895 (D.R.I. 1961) (stenographic fees, $1,767.90). See also notes 15 and 16 supra
and accompanying text.
"See, e.g., cases cited note 33 supra.
37 See, e.g., Bank of America v. Loew's Int'l Corp., 163 F. Supp. 924, 929-30 (S.D.N.Y.
1958). See generally CHunBouRn & LvIN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 427-63. Deposition
expenses are usually taxable as costs if the deposition was necessary or if it seemed
necessary at the time of taking, even though never used at the trial. These expenses
include fees for the presiding officer, stenographer, and sometimes a statutory allow-
ance for attorney's fees. See BARRON & HOLTzOFF, op. cit. supra note 1, § 1197, at 55-62.
s 324 F.2d at 364.
9 The issue of the appealability of a judgment solely for costs was faced by the
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with comparable discretionary matters,40 the Farmer rule should be
readily acceptable to the courts.41
court in Farmer, which held that a judgment is appealable where the question involves
an abuse of discretion by the trial court. This would seem to be in line with recent
cases. See, e.g., Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Labs., Inc., 232 F.2d 897 (9th
Cir. 1956); Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Prudence-Bonds Corp., 207 F.2d 67 (2d
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 904 (1954); Prudence-Bonds Corp. v. Prudence Realiza-
tion Corp., 174 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1949); Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co.,
176 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950). But see Newton v. Con-
solidated Gas Co., 265 U.S. 78 (1924); Walker v. Lee, 71 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1934); The
James McWilliams, 49 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1931). See also Goodhart, supra note 1,
at 877. Moreover, the issue appealed from involved more than the allowance of
certain items or the amount to be taxed; there was also the complicating matter of
the review of a decision of one trial court by another trial court. 324 F.2d at 364.
40 See, e.g., Goodhart, supra note 1, at 877; Comment, 44 ILL. L. REV. 507, 515-20
(1949); Comment, 49 YALE L.J. 699, 710-12 (1940).
," The Supreme Court granted certiorari to both parties in Farmer on the ques-
tions of (1) consideration of the relative financial resources of the parties; (2) appeal-
ability of a judgment solely for costs; (3) interpretation of the 1949 amendment to
28 U.S.C. § 1821 so as to reject the 100 mile rule. 84 Sup. Ct. 799 (1964). See notes
14, 18, and 38 supra.
